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In his article, Modiano raises a number of important issues regarding the 
role of English in post-Brexit Europe. In many ways, this discussion is 
very much about nationalism and its resurgence. Europe can be regarded as 
the birth-place of nationalism. Historically, particularly considering the 
18th and 19th centuries, the codification of national languages has been 
instrumental in the construction of modern nation states. The cultural and 
ideological connection between languages and nations is still so strong 
that, even now, it pervades most discourse on language. The EU language 
policy, for example, is entirely based on the idea that languages represent 
national identities. Strictly within the frame of that policy, English is 
just one of the 24 official languages of the Union. However, despite the 
equal standing accorded to English with respect to other languages in 
official EU documentation, any cursory glance at actual language practice 
immediately suggests a very different picture. The readers of this journal 
need no reminder of the fact that English is far more than the language of 
one specific nation state. Just to reiterate a piece of information that 
can be found in every textbook in the field, English is not only the most 
widespread language in the world, but is also one that is more widely used 
as an international lingua franca and/or additional language than as the 
primary national language of any one country. 
 
So, the fate of English is unlikely to change in any significant way in a 
post-Brexit scenario. As Modiano remarks, ‘It is probable that UK 
membership in the Union does not have any bearing on the decision among 
continental Europeans to use English’. This is because when they speak 
English Europeans do not use a national language, but an international 
lingua franca, whether or not the UK is part of the EU. And this leads me 
to the aspect of Modiano’s article that I find difficult to agree with, 
namely the attempt to impose a world Englishes (WE) analytical framework 
onto a context that is very different from those about which the framework 
was developed. In a nutshell, Modiano suggests that, free from the imposing 
presence of Britain and of British English, Euro English will finally 
thrive as an independent variety, similarly to what happened to Indian 
English or 
Singaporean English after the end of the British empire. 
 
I see three problems in Modiano’s argument.  
 
First of all, the relationship between Britain and the rest of Europe bears 
no similarity with that which Britain had with its colonies. The status and 
the roles of English in former British colonies were very different from 
what they are in contemporary Europe. Even as a full member of the EU, 
Britain is by no means a dominant presence in Europe. Germany, France and, 
to some extent, Italy, yield equal or more influence within an EU context. 
The presence of English in Europe has nothing to do with Britain’s 
membership in the EU but has everything to do with the role that the 
language has as international lingua franca. Business people, tourists or 
students from different EU countries are much more likely to use English 
than any other language to talk to one another, in exactly the same way as 
people from ASEAN countries do, for example. The fact that the current role 
of English as the preferred international lingua franca can be traced back 
historically to the expansion of the British Empire is a separate issue. I 
do not think the British are in any position where they can be engaged in a 
‘crusade to defend the integrity of British English’. And even if they 
were, such a crusade would be rather fruitless – English-using Europeans 
are on the whole unconcerned by the fact that there happen to be 60 million 
people in another European country who speak this language as their primary 
(and often only) language. 
 The linguistic consequences of Brexit within the EU apparatus are of course 
an entirely different matter. I agree with Modiano when he says it is 
likely there will be changes in the role of English here. But what I find 
problematic is that he seems to conflate the very specific context of the 
EU apparatus with the much more general one outside of it. It is true that 
decisions will have to be made as to the status of English, for example, in 
official EU documentation after Brexit, but these are very different issues 
from those that regard ordinary people’s language practices.  
 
The third, related, point is about the development of Euro English. 
Specifically, my contention is: how important is it for us in 
sociolinguistics to persist in wanting to identify (supra-)nationally 
defined varieties of English? Labels such as ‘Euro English’ or ‘British 
English’ conceptualize varieties as sealed packages characterized by 
internal uniformity and external distinction, and whose linguistic features 
are neatly distributed within national borders. But this misrepresents 
sociolinguistic reality. For example, the degree of linguistic variation 
within Britain is greater than anywhere else in the world. And, just like 
in other parts of the world, language practices in Britain are subject to 
the influence of transnational cultural flows emanating from the US, 
Australia and elsewhere (and of course the direction of such flows isn’t 
one way!). As regards ‘Euro English’, who really needs this label? The 
avoidance of idiomaticity, for example, which Modiano mentions as a 
feature, is presumably related to the cross-cultural nature of 
international communication and is not confined within a European context. 
Semantic shifts such as the one related to the word eventual(ly) are 
interesting but are part of the continuous flux that typifies English in 
its being in contact with other languages, in Europe and elsewhere.  
 
Thus, Europeans do not need linguistic independence from Britain in the 
same way as, say, Americans did in the 18th century and Australians in the 
20th. There are no British clutches that language practices in Europe need 
to be liberated from. The motivations that inspired Chinua Achebe to 
advocate the forging of a new, Nigerian English in the 1960s are out of 
place in 21st-century Europe. 
 
The result of the EU referendum that has led us to the brink of Brexit was, 
after all, the first real proof of significant shifts in public opinion 
that have been taking place especially in the industrialized West as a 
result of a combination of factors: the lack of a real recovery after the 
international financial crisis in 2008, rising unemployment, increased 
inequalities in income between those at the very top of the wealth scale 
and everybody else, and the growing threat posed by international 
terrorism. As governments seemed to be protecting financial institutions 
while imposing austerity measures, people lost confidence in politicians’ 
ability to ensure more equitable societies. However, driven by relentless 
toxic media campaigns, the anger and the frustration of those who feel 
betrayed by politics have been channelled towards the poorest, not the 
richest,1 towards how governments are supposedly too open to ‘uncontrolled’ 
migration, rather than how they continue to favour large corporations (for 
example through a laissez-faire attitude to taxation). A narrative has 
emerged according to which open-border policies and migration are seen as 
the root causes of unemployment, cultural disorientation and even 
terrorism. 
 
In the eyes of a growing number of people, the walled medieval citadel 
represents a more reassuring representation of society than the 21st 
century global village. New fences and walls are being erected all over 
Europe at an unprecedented rate to keep migrants out. In the face of such 
insularity, the presence of a common language that we can all use to 
exchange ideas and points of view should be celebrated. There is no need to 
nationalize it in order to make it more acceptable. There is no need to 
continue to postulate the existence of nationally-defined Englishes by 
emphasizing differences among them when so much of the usefulness of 
English resides in what makes it our common language. 
 
NOTE 
1. The latter, paradoxically, are greatly admired and even entrusted with 
the task of changing the system, as the recent election of Donald Trump as 
US president testifies. 
 
